{"id":"CVE-2026-48079","title":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform","summary":"OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_toke…","severity":"high","cvss":7.4,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","cwe":["CWE-613"],"published":"2026-08-06","updated":"2026-09-08","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48079","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/2419f9e87a8abad72f31b1fedeb80c758b30322e","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/f833dbf50059ff7d4ea42ce7bbb3a5cdcf7a6929","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh","label":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0"}],"tags":["nvd"],"epss":0.00386,"epssPercentile":0.32511,"ingestedAt":"2026-09-08T21:11:12.270Z","slug":"CVE-2026-48079","body":"## Overview\n\nOpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":40.7,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}