{"id":"CVE-2026-48035","aliases":["GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"],"title":"@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","summary":"@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened","severity":"high","cwe":["CWE-1059"],"vendor":"hulumi","product":"@hulumi/baseline","ecosystem":"npm","affected":["@hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0"],"patched":["@hulumi/baseline 1.4.0"],"published":"2026-06-10","updated":"2026-06-10","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"},{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"}],"tags":["ghsa","npm"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-07T15:41:59.575Z","epss":0.0026,"epssPercentile":0.17967,"slug":"CVE-2026-48035","body":"## Overview\n\n**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nThe S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:\n\n1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)\n2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown.\n3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: \"sandbox\"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.\n\n#### Impact\n\nConsumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/baseline@1.4.0`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`):\n\n- refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier;\n- emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);\n- adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nReplicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `@hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `@hulumi/baseline 1.4.0`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}