{"id":"CVE-2026-48032","aliases":["GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692"],"title":"@hulumi/policies bypasses IAM-role policy checks when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers","summary":"@hulumi/policies bypasses IAM-role policy checks when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers","severity":"high","cwe":["CWE-697"],"vendor":"hulumi","product":"@hulumi/policies","ecosystem":"npm","affected":["@hulumi/policies < 1.4.0"],"patched":["@hulumi/policies 1.4.0"],"published":"2026-06-10","updated":"2026-06-10","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692"},{"url":"https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692"}],"tags":["ghsa","npm"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-07T15:41:59.581Z","epss":0.0031,"epssPercentile":0.24014,"slug":"CVE-2026-48032","body":"## Overview\n\n**Affected:** `@hulumi/policies` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-697 (Incorrect Comparison)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nAWS IAM trust policies can list more than one federated identity provider — for example, a role that accepts BOTH GitHub Actions OIDC and Google's OIDC. The `G_OIDC_1` and `G_OIDC_2` policy rules are supposed to flag IAM roles whose GitHub-OIDC trust is too permissive (e.g. wildcard `sub:` conditions that would let any branch or any pull request assume the role).\n\nThe bug: when the role's `Principal.Federated` field was a JSON array of multiple providers, the rules failed to recognise that GitHub Actions was one of them. The providers list was coerced into a single comma-joined string, the matcher only looked at the start, and the GitHub OIDC hostname was lost in the join. Both rules concluded \"this isn't a GitHub-OIDC role\" and skipped the wildcard check.\n\n#### Impact\n\nA trust policy that listed the real GitHub OIDC provider ARN alongside any second provider would slip past both detectors. Consumers using `HulumiHardeningPack` or `HulumiGithubHardeningPack` could ship an IAM role with wildcard `sub:` conditions (allowing untrusted PRs from forks to assume the role) while their policy validation reported the stack as compliant. The G_OIDC_2 detector also failed to mark such roles for the cluster-admin / `AdministratorAccess` blast-radius check.\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/policies@1.4.0`. The shared GitHub-OIDC-provider matcher now correctly walks lists of providers — if any element of the list is the real GitHub OIDC ARN, the role is treated as GitHub-OIDC-assumable and the wildcard / blast-radius checks apply.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nNone reliable — upgrade is the fix.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster A); regression tests at `packages/policies/tests/github/{g-oidc-2,github-oidc-issuer}.test.ts`.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `@hulumi/policies < 1.4.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `@hulumi/policies 1.4.0`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}