{"id":"CVE-2026-48025","aliases":["GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v"],"title":"nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing","summary":"nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing","severity":"medium","cwe":["CWE-244"],"vendor":"juev","product":"github.com/juev/nebula-mesh","ecosystem":"go","affected":["github.com/juev/nebula-mesh < 0.3.7","github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh < 0.3.7"],"patched":["github.com/juev/nebula-mesh 0.3.7","github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh 0.3.7"],"published":"2026-06-10","updated":"2026-06-26","source":"GHSA","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v"},{"url":"https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/bca1d5914fbaf3517d3b86145a802c00de4a8122"},{"url":"https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.7"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v"}],"tags":["ghsa","go"],"ingestedAt":"2026-07-07T15:41:59.553Z","epss":0.00292,"epssPercentile":0.21956,"slug":"CVE-2026-48025","body":"## Overview\n\n`internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64` constructs a `CAManager` with the plaintext `ed25519.PrivateKey` after unwrapping via the master key; `internal/pki/ca.go:13-16` stores it. Callers at `internal/api/enroll.go:116`, `internal/api/updates.go:297`, and `internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40` use the manager for one `Sign()` and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release.\n\nThe keystore package's contract (`internal/keystore/keystore.go` doc: *\"Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed\"*) is not met by the `CAManager` consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.6.\n\n## Threat model\nMemory-read access: core dump, ptrace, kernel swap to disk, container/VM snapshot, OOM-debug bundle, side-channel via shared cache lines. Not a remote-network vulnerability, but defeats the master-key + envelope-encryption design's promise of \"private key never lingers\".\n\n## Suggested fix\nAdd a `Wipe()` method on `CAManager`:\n\n```go\n// internal/pki/ca.go\nfunc (m *CAManager) Wipe() {\n    if m == nil {\n        return\n    }\n    keystore.Zeroize(m.caKey)\n}\n```\n\nAt each call site (`enroll.go:116`, `updates.go:297`, `mobile_bundle.go:40`, and any new caller), `defer caMgr.Wipe()` immediately after the `Resolve()` call. Pattern mirrors the existing `defer keystore.Zeroize(dek)` discipline in the keystore package.\n\nOptional follow-up: wrap `m.Sign()` to zeroize after each call, removing the contract on callers — but the `defer` pattern is sufficient as a minimum.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `github.com/juev/nebula-mesh < 0.3.7`\n- `github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh < 0.3.7`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `github.com/juev/nebula-mesh 0.3.7`\n- `github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh 0.3.7`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":28,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":27.5,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}