{"id":"CVE-2026-44307","aliases":["GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpq","PYSEC-2026-2617"],"title":"Mako vulnerable to path traversal via backslash URI on Windows in TemplateLookup","summary":"Mako vulnerable to path traversal via backslash URI on Windows in TemplateLookup","severity":"high","vendor":"mako","product":"mako","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["mako < 1.3.12"],"patched":["mako 1.3.12"],"published":"2026-05-06","updated":"2026-09-10","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.452547864Z","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpq","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-2h4p-vjrc-8xpq"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44307"},{"url":"https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/issues/435"},{"url":"https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/commit/72e10c573ca0fbcbddd4455abca8ce92a61780d7"},{"url":"https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako"},{"url":"https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/releases/tag/rel_1_3_12"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00609,"epssPercentile":0.47846,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-13T18:57:51.322Z","slug":"CVE-2026-44307","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\n\nOn Windows, a URI using backslash traversal (e.g. `\\..\\..\\ secret.txt`) bypasses the directory traversal check in `Template.__init__` and the `posixpath`-based normalization in `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, allowing reads of files outside the configured template directory.\n\n\n## Details\n\nThe root cause is a mismatch between `posixpath` (used for URI normalization in `get_template()`) and `os.path` (used for file access via `os.path.isfile()` and validation via `os.path.normpath()` in `Template.__init__`). On Windows, `os.path` is `ntpath`, which treats `\\` as a path separator, while `posixpath` treats it as a literal character.\n\nThe vulnerability chain:\n\n1. `get_template()` strips only leading `/` via `re.sub(r\"^\\/+\", \"\", uri)` and normalizes with `posixpath` — backslash `\\` is treated as a literal character, so `\\..\\ secret.txt` passes through with `..` undetected.\n2. `Template.__init__()` validation uses `os.path.normpath()` — on Windows this resolves `\\..\\ secret.txt` to `\\secret.txt`, which does not start with `..`, so the `startswith(\"..\")` check passes.\n3. `os.path.isfile()` on Windows interprets `\\` as a path separator, resolving the `..` traversal and finding files outside the template directory.\n\n### Affected code\n\n- `mako/lookup.py`: `TemplateLookup.get_template()` uses `posixpath.normpath`/`posixpath.join` for path construction but `os.path.isfile()` for existence check\n- `mako/template.py`: `Template.__init__()` URI validation uses `os.path.normpath()` which on Windows resolves backslash traversal to a form that passes the `startswith(\"..\")` guard\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an application passes user-controlled template names or include paths to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`, an attacker on Windows may be able to load and disclose readable files outside the configured template directory. The primary impact is local file disclosure. If the targeted file contains Mako/Python template syntax, it may also be parsed and executed as a template.\n\n## Remediation\n\nThe fix should normalize backslashes to forward slashes early in the URI processing pipeline, before any path operations, to ensure consistent behavior across platforms.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `mako < 1.3.12`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `mako 1.3.12`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}