{"id":"CVE-2026-33139","aliases":["GHSA-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6","PYSEC-2026-3030"],"title":"PySpector has a Plugin Sandbox Bypass leads to Arbitrary Code Execution","summary":"PySpector has a Plugin Sandbox Bypass leads to Arbitrary Code Execution","severity":"high","vendor":"pyspector","product":"pyspector","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["pyspector < 0.1.7"],"patched":["pyspector 0.1.7"],"published":"2026-03-18","updated":"2026-07-13","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ParzivalHack/PySpector/security/advisories/GHSA-v3xv-8vc3-h2m6"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33139"},{"url":"https://github.com/ParzivalHack/PySpector"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00169,"epssPercentile":0.06582,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-13T18:58:03.146Z","slug":"CVE-2026-33139","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\nPySpector versions `<= 0.1.6` are affected by a security validation bypass in the plugin system. The `validate_plugin_code()` function in `plugin_system.py`, performs static AST analysis to block dangerous API calls before a plugin is trusted and executed. However, the `internal resolve_name()` helper only handles `ast.Name` and `ast.Attribute` node types, returning `None` for all others. When a plugin uses indirect function calls via `getattr()` (such as `getattr(os, 'system')`) the outer call's func node is of type `ast.Call`, causing `resolve_name()` to return `None`, and the security check to be silently skipped. The plugin incorrectly passes the trust workflow, and executes arbitrary system commands on the user's machine when loaded.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can deliver a malicious plugin file to a PySpector user and convince them to install it, can achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's local machine. Exploitation requires the victim to explicitly run `pyspector plugin install --trust` on the malicious file (a deliberate multi-step action that meaningfully limits the attack surface compared to passive vulnerabilities). However, the bypass directly undermines the security guarantee that `validate_plugin_code()` is designed to provide. Once the plugin is trusted and executed, the following is achievable:\n- Full read/write access to the local filesystem\n- Exfiltration of sensitive data and environment variables (i.e. API keys, credentials, etc...)\n- Establishment of persistence mechanisms\n- Lateral movement in CI/CD environments where PySpector runs with elevated permissions (pre-commit hooks and scheduled scans)\n\nAny user of PySpector who installs third-party plugins outside the official repository is potentially affected.\n\n### PoC\nThe following steps reproduce the vulnerability on PySpector `<= 0.1.6`:\n1. Create a malicious plugin file that uses getattr-based indirect calls to bypass AST validation, and confirm the validator incorrectly marks it as safe:\n<img width=\"1300\" height=\"675\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4de3a0d1-1c77-4454-ad10-2369d5ca9997\" />\n2.  Run PySpector Plugin Validator module (this confirms the validator incorrectly marks the plugin as safe):\n<img width=\"908\" height=\"239\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3e3b9603-4d95-4a39-be97-4163f6639599\" />\n3. Install and trust the plugin through the normal PySpector workflow:\n\n`pyspector plugin install /tmp/evil_plugin.py --trust`\n4. Execute the plugin, during a scan:\n`pyspector scan /any/target --plugin evil`\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `pyspector < 0.1.7`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `pyspector 0.1.7`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}