{"id":"CVE-2026-22870","aliases":["GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v","PYSEC-2026-1429"],"title":"GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS","summary":"GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS","severity":"high","vendor":"guarddog","product":"guarddog","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["guarddog < 2.7.1"],"patched":["guarddog 2.7.1"],"published":"2026-01-13","updated":"2026-07-07","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/security/advisories/GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22870"},{"url":"https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog/commit/c3fb07b4838945f42497e78b7a02bcfb1e63969b"},{"url":"https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00519,"epssPercentile":0.43085,"ingestedAt":"2026-07-08T18:25:48.877Z","slug":"CVE-2026-22870","body":"## Overview\n\n## Summary\n\nGuardDog's `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function  \n**Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb)  \n**Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8)  \n**Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `safe_extract()` function handles TAR files securely using the `tarsafe` library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation:\n```python\nelif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):\n    with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, \"r\") as zip:\n        for file in zip.namelist():\n            zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file))\n```\n\n**Missing protections:**\n- ❌ No decompressed size limit\n- ❌ No compression ratio validation  \n- ❌ No file count limits\n- ❌ No total extracted size validation\n\n## Impact\n\n### Denial of Service Scenarios\n\n**1. CI/CD Pipeline Disruption**\n- Attacker publishes malicious package to PyPI\n- Developer adds package to requirements.txt\n- CI/CD runs GuardDog scan\n- Disk fills (GitHub Actions: standard 14GB limit)\n- All deployments blocked\n\n**2. Resource Exhaustion**\n- Local development environments\n- Security scanning infrastructure  \n- Automated scanning systems\n- Docker containers with limited disk\n\n**3. Supply Chain Attack Amplification**\n- Single malicious package blocks security scanning\n- Prevents detection of other malicious packages\n- Forces manual intervention\n- Increases security team workload\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd size validation for ZIP files similar to what `tarsafe` provides for TAR files\n\n### Configuration Options\n\nMake limits configurable via environment variables or config file\n\n## Additional Improvements\n\n1. **Add warning logs** when archives approach limits\n2. **Provide clear error messages** for users\n3. **Document limits** in user-facing documentation\n4. **Add tests** for zip bomb detection\n5. **Consider using a safe ZIP library** (similar to tarsafe)\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `guarddog < 2.7.1`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `guarddog 2.7.1`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}