{"id":"CVE-2026-19576","title":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15","summary":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is u…","severity":"medium","cvss":6.8,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwe":["CWE-787"],"published":"2026-10-11","updated":"2026-10-11","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-11T18:16:58.300","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19576","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea","label":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr","label":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}],"tags":["nvd"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-12T14:50:34.065Z","slug":"CVE-2026-19576","body":"## Overview\n\nThe Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":37,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":37.4,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}