{"id":"CVE-2026-13214","title":"The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg()","summary":"The OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string…","severity":"critical","cvss":9.8,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwe":["CWE-787"],"published":"2026-08-25","updated":"2026-09-28","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-28T23:10:00.143","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13214","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/afbf880b04188ae53451a0ade4ac62b654fdff34","label":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fqhf-6v24-4px2","label":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org"}],"tags":["nvd"],"ingestedAt":"2026-09-28T23:23:00.537Z","slug":"CVE-2026-13214","body":"## Overview\n\nThe OCPP 1.6 client in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp_j.c contains a stack buffer overflow in parse_getconfig_msg(). When handling a GetConfiguration request from the central system, the handler copied the attacker-controlled JSON \"key\" string into the caller's fixed 50-byte stack buffer (skey[CISTR50], declared in subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c) using an unbounded strcpy(). The parsed key value points directly into the receive buffer, so its length is bounded only by the message size (CONFIG_OCPP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, default 2048).\n\nThe GetConfiguration message is delivered over the WebSocket connection that the charge point opens to its configured central system. The reader thread ocpp_wsreader() reads the message into ui->recv_buf and dispatches it to parse_getconfig_msg() via the PDU function table. An attacker who controls the central system endpoint, or a man-in-the-middle on an unencrypted connection, can send a GetConfiguration request whose \"key\" field exceeds 50 bytes and overflow the reader thread's stack with attacker-chosen bytes.\n\nThe consequence is a remotely triggerable stack smash on the OCPP reader thread: at minimum a denial of service, and plausibly remote code execution depending on build-time hardening such as stack canaries and MPU configuration. The fix replaces the strcpy() with a bounded strncpy(key, payload.key[0], CISTR50 - 1) followed by explicit NUL termination, matching the bounded copies already used by the sibling handlers.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"midnight","depthScore":54,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":53.9,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}