{"id":"CVE-2026-114611","title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack","summary":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment…","severity":"critical","cvss":9.1,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","cvssSource":"cna","cwe":["CWE-295"],"vendor":"schorschii","product":"OCO-Server","affected":["OCO-Server < 1.2.3"],"published":"2026-10-22","updated":"2026-10-22","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","source":"CVEORG","sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-114611","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","label":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639"},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","label":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404"},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","label":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df"}],"tags":["cve.org"],"ingestedAt":"2026-10-22T22:00:50.355Z","slug":"CVE-2026-114611","body":"## Overview\n\nOCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `OCO-Server < 1.2.3`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"midnight","depthScore":50,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":50.1,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}