{"id":"CVE-2026-102716","title":"An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests\n\n\n\nthat carry a Session header the parser cannot convert.\n\n\n\nThe Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status c…","summary":"An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests\n\n\n\nthat carry a Session header the parser cannot convert.\n\n\n\nThe Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status c…","severity":"high","cvss":8.7,"cvssVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","cwe":["CWE-401"],"vendor":"Eclipse Foundation","product":"eclipse-threadx/netxduo","affected":["eclipse-threadx/netxduo <= 6.5.1"],"published":"2026-09-29","updated":"2026-09-29","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-29T18:17:10.943","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102716","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-q462-246c-x3jc","label":"emo@eclipse.org"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org"],"cvssSource":"cna","ingestedAt":"2026-09-29T18:42:35.814Z","slug":"CVE-2026-102716","body":"## Overview\n\nAn unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests\n\n\n\nthat carry a Session header the parser cannot convert.\n\n\n\nThe Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status code:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/rtsp/nx_rtsp_server.c:2754 */\n\n\n\nstatus = _nx_utility_string_to_uint(field_value_ptr, field_value_length, &session_id);\n\n\n\nif (status)\n\n\n\n{\n\n    return(status);      /* NX_INVALID_PARAMETERS / NX_SIZE_ERROR / NX_OVERFLOW */\n\n\n}\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nEvery other branch of the same function maps its failure to an RTSP status first. The CSeq branch\n\n\n\neighteen lines earlier does exactly that (line 2736 returns NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST). The\n\n\n\nraw code then reaches `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send` (nx_rtsp_server.c:1234), which does not\n\n\n\nrecognise it, takes a path that returns without releasing the response packet it already allocated,\n\n\n\nand the block never goes back to the pool.\n\n\n\nSix requests with an empty Session header against a 22 packet pool:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nvalid requests:      after request 6: pool available = 21,  AFTER = 22 / 22\n\n\n\nmalformed requests:  after request 6: pool available = 16,  AFTER = 17 / 22\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nOne block per request, not returned when the client disconnects. Twenty six requests take the pool\n\n\n\nto zero and the server starts failing allocations, after which it serves nobody. If the pool is\n\n\n\nshared with the rest of the application, as it is in the shipped sample, the rest of the stack\n\n\n\nstops with it.\n\n\n\nConvert the `_nx_utility_string_to_uint` failure in the Session branch into\n\n\n\nNX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST the way the CSeq branch does, and release the response packet on\n\n\n\nevery exit path of `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send`.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":48,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":47.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}