{"id":"CVE-2026-102464","title":"In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.34] or [5.0.0,5.0.12] or [5.1.0,5.1.9] or [5.2.0, 5.2.0], the Eclipse Vert.x MQTT (vertx-mqtt) MqttClient stores every inbound QoS 2 PUBLISH message received from the broker in an internal map (qos2…","summary":"In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.34] or [5.0.0,5.0.12] or [5.1.0,5.1.9] or [5.2.0, 5.2.0], the Eclipse Vert.x MQTT (vertx-mqtt) MqttClient stores every inbound QoS 2 PUBLISH message received from the broker in an internal map (qos2…","severity":"high","cvss":8.2,"cvssVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","vendor":"Eclipse Foundation","product":"Eclipse Vert.x","affected":["eclipse_vert.x >= 4.0.0 <= 4.5.34","eclipse_vert.x >= 5.0.0 <= 5.0.12","eclipse_vert.x >= 5.1.0 <= 5.1.9","eclipse_vert.x 5.2.0"],"published":"2026-10-15","updated":"2026-10-15","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-15T09:17:15.283","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102464","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/vert-x3/vertx-mqtt/security/advisories/GHSA-46xj-5735-6qrp","label":"emo@eclipse.org"},{"url":"https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/344","label":"emo@eclipse.org"}],"tags":["nvd","cve.org"],"cvssSource":"cna","ingestedAt":"2026-10-15T08:58:33.098Z","slug":"CVE-2026-102464","body":"## Overview\n\nIn Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.34] or [5.0.0,5.0.12] or [5.1.0,5.1.9] or [5.2.0, 5.2.0], the Eclipse Vert.x MQTT (vertx-mqtt) MqttClient stores every inbound QoS 2 PUBLISH message received from the broker in an internal map (qos2inbound) while awaiting the corresponding PUBREL packet to complete the QoS 2 handshake. This map has no size limit; the maxInflightQueue option is enforced only on the outbound publish path and does not constrain inbound message retention.\n\n\n\nA malicious or compromised MQTT broker can exploit this by sending QoS 2 PUBLISH messages with distinct packet identifiers and withholding the PUBREL responses. Each incomplete handshake causes the client to retain the full publish message (topic, payload, and metadata) indefinitely, leading to unbounded memory growth in the Vert.x process. This can degrade the MQTT-consuming application or cause out-of-memory termination.\n\n\n\nThe impacted component is io.vertx:vertx-mqtt.\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.","depth":"twilight","depthScore":45,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":45.1,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}