{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","title":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system","summary":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on rou…","severity":"medium","cvss":5.3,"cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","cwe":["CWE-307"],"vendor":"strapi","product":"strapi","affected":["strapi < 5.45.0"],"patched":["strapi 5.45.0"],"published":"2026-05-14","updated":"2026-10-14","sourceUpdated":"2026-10-14T13:10:00.187","source":"NVD","sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64526","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0","label":"security-advisories@github.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw","label":"security-advisories@github.com"}],"tags":["nvd"],"epss":0.00492,"epssPercentile":0.40586,"ingestedAt":"2026-10-14T13:30:58.500Z","slug":"CVE-2025-64526","body":"## Overview\n\nStrapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.\n\n## Affected\n\n- `strapi < 5.45.0`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade past the affected range:\n\n- `strapi 5.45.0`","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":29,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":29.2,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}